Intrusion detection in real-time in a multi-node, multi-host environment by Barrus, Joseph D.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1997-09
Intrusion detection in real-time in a multi-node,
multi-host environment
Barrus, Joseph D.
















Thesis Advisor: Neil Rowe
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0186
Public reporting burden (or this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing
and reviewing the collection of Information Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of Information, Including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services,
Directorate tor information Operations and Reports, 1 2 1 5 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302 and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Projeci (0704-01 86), Washington, DC 20503




REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
TITLE AND SUBTITLE










9. SPONSOR/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense of the
U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)
While there exist many tools and methods used to recognize intrusions into single system environments, there are few that can recognize
and handle attacks in real time. This group is further reduced when adding the complexity of recognizing and handling intrusions occurring in a
heterogeneous networked environment. The results of the thesis are an open architecture design for a real-time intrusion detection system to handle
intrusions in a heterogeneous network and the system requirements, specifications, protocols and software module design to support an
implementation of a system using this architecture. The architecture presented herein comprises a distributed system of autonomous agents that
reside on the various hosts in a network. These agents communicate with each other in a coordinated effort to identify and respond to intrusions into
the network by sending messages to each other detailing the identity and threat level of a potential or imminent attack. To quantify the threat level of
an ongoing attack, this thesis also presents an alert level hierarchy based on the danger level and transferability of the threat to the various hosts
within the network.
14. SUBJECT TERMS
Intrusion Detection, Network Security,


















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Sid 239-18
11
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
INTRUSION DETECTION IN REAL-TIME IN A MULTI-NODE, MULTI-HOST
ENVIRONMENT
Joseph D. Barrus
B.S.M.E., Rice University, 1985
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of









While there exist many tools and methods used to recognize intrusions into single
system environments, there are few that can recognize and handle attacks in real time.
This group is further reduced when adding the complexity of recognizing and handling
intrusions occurring in a heterogeneous networked environment. The results of the thesis
are an open architecture design for a real-time intrusion detection system to handle
intrusions in a heterogeneous network and the system requirements, specifications,
protocols and software module design to support an implementation of a system using
this architecture. The architecture presented herein comprises a distributed system of
autonomous agents that reside on the various hosts in a network. These agents
communicate with each other in a coordinated effort to identify and respond to intrusions
into the network by sending messages to each other detailing the identity and threat level
of a potential or imminent attack. To quantify the threat level of an ongoing attack, this
thesis also presents an alert level hierarchy based on the danger level and transferability





B. INTRUDER RECOGNITION 2
C. THE CHALLENGE 3
II. APPLICATION DOMAIN 7
A. INTRUSION DETECTION 7
B. MISUSE DETECTION 8
1. Expert Systems 8
2. Model Based Approaches 8
3. Pattern Matching 9
4. State Transition Analysis 10
5. Specification-Based Approaches 10
C. ANOMALOUS BEHAVIOR DETECTION 1
1
1. Statistical Analysis 1
2. Predictive Pattern Generation or Rule-Based Detection 12
3. Neural Networks 12
D. WHY DO WE NEED INTRUSION DETECTION? 13
E. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 15
1. Requirement 1: Recognition 15
2. Requirement 2: Escalating Behavior 16
3. Requirement 3: Communication 17
4. Requirement 4: Response 18
5. Requirement 5: Manual Control 19
6. Requirement 6: Adaptability 19
7. Requirement 7: Concurrency 20
8. Requirement 8: Scaleability 21
9. Requirement 9: Resistance to Compromise of Intrusion Software Itself 21
10. Requirement 10: Efficiency and Reliability 21
11. Requirement 11: Extensibility 22
12. Requirement 12: Flexibility 22
F. SUMMARY 23
III. PREVIOUS SOLUTIONS 25
A. NETWORK SECURITY MODEL (NSM) OR NETWORK INTRUSION
DETECTOR (NID) 25
B. NEXT GENERATION INTRUSION-DETECTION EXPERT SYSTEM (NIDES)26
C. DOROTHY DENNING'S GENERIC INTRUSION DETECTION MODEL 26
D. ADAPTIVE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (AID) 27
vn
E. DISTRIBUTED RECOGNITION AND ACCOUNTABILITY (DRA ) 28
F. DISTRIBUTED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (DIDS) 29
G. GRAPH BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (GRIDS) 31
H. CROSBIE AND SPAFFORD'S AUTONOMOUS AGENTS 33
I. SUMMARY 35
IV. ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN 37
A. A PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 37
B. FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION 39
1. Attack Taxonomy 39
2. Alert level hierarchy 44
3. Thresholds 48
4. Network Identification 49
5. Communications 50
6. Agent design 54
7. Example Intrusion Scenario 58
C. SUMMARY 62
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 65
A. REQUIREMENTS SATISFACTION 65
1. Requirement 1: Recognition 65
2. Requirement 2: Escalating Behavior 65
3. Requirement 3: Communication 66
4. Requirement 4: Response 66
5. Requirement 5: Manual Control 66
6. Requirement 6: Adaptability 67
7. Requirement 7: Concurrency 68
8. Requirement 8: Scaleability 68
9. Requirement 9: Resistance to Compromise of Intrusion Software Itself 69
10. Requirement 10: Efficiency and Reliability 70
11. Requirement 11: Extensibility 70
12. Requirement 12: Flexibility 71
B. CONCLUSIONS 71
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 72
LIST OF REFERENCES 75
BIBLIOGRAPHY 77
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 79
Vlll
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Dorothy Denning's Generic Intrusion Detection Model 27
2. Adaptive Intrusion Detection System 28
3. Distributed Intrusion Detection System 30
4. Graph Based Intrusion Detection System 32
5. Crosbie and Spafford's Autonomous Agents System 34
6. Distributed Autonomous Agent Network Intrusion Detection and Response System 37
7. Intrusion Attack Class Hierarchy 44
8. Object Model of Autonomous Agent Design 55




I would like to thank Ron Broersma, my boss, for sponsoring me locally on my
thesis. Without this sponsorship and his willingness to be my local advisor, I might not
have found enough time to succeed.
I would also like to thank Duston Hayward of NRaD and Mantak Shing of Naval
Postgraduate School for all their effort in providing the logistic support in getting all the
proper routing of documents to and from both locations, the signatures needed and all the
other bells and whistles required to get this thesis approved in time for September 1997
graduation.
And lastly, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my wife, Leslie, for





The enormous growth of the Internet has not come without problems. Many more
people are taking advantage of the rapid advances in network technology by connecting
their systems and networks to the Internet. Their intentions are varied. They include the
traditional exchange of information and ideas to support research, education, etc. But the
most explosive growth has been in the commercial sector with companies advertising
their products and services as well as placing their wares, services, etc. online for access
and sale. While this is generally a good thing, it does greatly increase the vulnerability to
attack of all systems on the Internet. There are more systems to attack as well as more
systems from which to attack. These attacks take advantage of the flaws or omissions
that exist within the various operating systems and software that run on the many hosts in
the network.
Why these attacks exist in the first place can be explained by simple sociology.
The computer network world is just an extension of our society and comes with the same
variety of personalities. The difference here is that advanced technology can provide very
sophisticated tools with which to do damage or to hide from recognition. The kind of
damage that can occur includes theft of information and resources, malicious vandalism,
violation of privacy, violation of national security, industrial espionage, etc. This is
usually accomplished by a subversion of whatever existing security mechanisms are
deployed on a host with the intent to execute operations or gain access to areas beyond
the allowed authorization.
The various security mechanisms that exist are numerous. Each operating system
usually comes with its own protections against access to certain files and processes. This
is further varied by the different versions of these same operating systems which might
provide slightly different implementations of the same mechanisms. Other security
mechanisms include third party software that sits on top of the system kernel and provide
additional services like monitoring the activity on the system looking for specific
violations. The degree of protection that exists on any given host depends on how much
time and effort has been put into applying these mechanisms. Often times, this requires
much more time and effort than is desired by the various system administrators and many
systems are left in a quite open and extremely vulnerable state. Many of the security
mechanisms have a significant effect on the performance of a system and thus may not be
used for this reason as well.
B. INTRUDER RECOGNITION
When an intruder attacks a system, the ideal response would be to stop his activity
before he can do any damage or access sensitive information. This would require
recognition of the attack as it takes place in real time. There are few automated methods
to perform this recognition. Most real-time methods are applied manually by human
observation by explicitly looking for the attack as a result of previous analysis or due to
some triggering event of suspicious behavior, probably recognized by blind luck. The
triggering event does not necessarily imply an intrusion, but is enough of an indicator for
the system administrator to pay close attention. If further behavior continues to suggest
an intrusion, the system administrator can confirm this via manual contact with the owner
of the account from which the attack originates. He then can take action to halt the attack
if necessary.
Recognition of an attack is further complicated in a networked environment. A
single suspect behavior on a single host in a network may not warrant any serious action.
However, repeated suspect behavior across several hosts in a network may indeed suggest
an attack, with a response definitely warranted. This would be very difficult for a human
to recognize.
C. THE CHALLENGE
The challenge is to automate this process in a networked environment in such a
way that is effective, efficient, scaleable, lower in overhead, fault-tolerant, flexible,
extensible and resistant to compromise. This is no small task. Some attempts at this have
been tried with most methods concentrating on analyzing the network traffic at the single
point it passes into the network. Certainly a worthwhile endeavor, but in and of itself, it
may not be enough. This kind of approach does not scale well and may run into difficulty
in dealing with large amounts of data possibly overlooking some attacks. It also does not
address attacks coming from within the network. Network administrators must be
concerned with the unauthorized behavior of their own users. As network traffic
increases, many of these intrusion detection systems can suffer significant performance
degradation. These systems also operate as a single entity offering only a single point of
failure, thus being vulnerable to execution faults or failures, or being compromised by
external sources.
Also, most current intrusion detection systems do not offer real-time response, but
rather are used to make determinations that an attack did occur and that some action can
be taken after the fact. This may be too late as the intended damage may already be done.
Finally, these systems are not very flexible when it comes to extending the capability of
the system to recognize the ever-growing pool of attack types. Often, this would require
taking the system down and doing a complete reinstallation, thus leaving the entire
network vulnerable while this is taking place.
This paper will address an approach that attempts to provide a solution to these
specific issues. In general, this paper will propose a distributed architecture using
autonomous agents for a system to monitor security related activity within a network.
Each agent operates cooperatively yet independently of each other providing for better
efficiency, real-time response and distribution of resources. This kind of architecture also
provides significant advantages in dealing with the issues, such as scaleability, flexibility,
extensibility, fault tolerance, resistance to compromise, etc. In addition, this thesis offers
an object-oriented modular approach to the design of the agent software, helping to solve
many of these issues, particularly extensibility and efficiency.
Chapter II discusses the intrusion detection domain, the methodologies and
approaches to the various problems. It also discusses the requirements necessary for a
proper intrusion detection system. Chapter HI details specific intrusion detection systems
previously offered as solutions and their advantages and disadvantages. Chapter IV
proposes the new approach for a solution that is the subject of this thesis. Finally,
Chapter V discusses the results of this approach and how it satisfies the requirements for




An intrusion attempt can be defined as the "potential possibility of a deliberate
unauthorized attempt to access information, manipulate information, or render a system
unreliable or unusable." [Ref. 1] This kind of behavior obviously constitutes misuse and
abuse of a computer system. An intrusion detection system can be defined as a system
that "must identify, preferably in real time, unauthorized use, misuse, and abuse of
computer systems." [Ref. 2]
Most intrusions can be classified into either one of two large groups: Misuse
intrusions or Anomaly intrusions. Misuse attacks are well defined, previously
documented attacks. Their behavior is known. Most systems that handle these types of
attacks do so by trying to recognize the attack pattern as it occurs. Ideally, misuse
detection systems can represent known attacks as a type of signature so that even
variations of the same type of attack can be matched against this signature and
recognized. Anomaly intrusions are recognized through deviations from the normal
behavior of a system or user. Profiles of system or user behavior are defined and stored
with subsequent behavior being compared to this profile. If it deviates beyond a certain
threshold, a flag can be raised. Anomaly detection usually requires time to establish and
maintain credible profiles and is more susceptible to false positives than misuse detection.
Several approaches have been established to monitor both types of intrusions.
B. MISUSE DETECTION
Misuse detection mechanisms have used the following schemes to detect
intrusions within a system or network.
1. Expert Systems
As the most commonly used method of detecting misuse intrusions, expert
systems rely on a set of rules specifying conditions that must be met. If the full set of
rules are met, an intrusion is detected. A major disadvantage of expert systems is that the
rules set is non-sequential; that is, there is no ordering implied to the set of rules. This
may make it difficult to positively identify an attack in those cases where they can only be
determined by their ordering of events. Furthermore, expert systems also are only as
good as the rules that have been placed in their rules base. If the rules base is not
properly populated, then some intrusions may be missed.
2. Model Based Approaches
This method uses model definitions of misuse attacks and combines them with
evidential reasoning to identify the occurrence of an attack. Certain activities are
monitored and the system expects that these activities may imply a particular intrusion
scenario is taking place. The model based approach comprises three main components.
The anticipator predicts the next behavior in the active intrusion model based on the
scenario model and passes this to the planner. The planner then determines the format
this behavior will have in the audit trail. The interpreter then searches for a match of this
behavior in the audit trail, continuing the search until there is enough evidence to flag an
intrusion. This method can be very efficient in filtering through the audit trail data
improving performance. Also, the evidentiary reasoning involved helps offset false
positives. However, false positives can only be eliminated if the models absolutely do
not mimic any normal behavior. Intrusions can also be overlooked if patterns are not
easily recognizable.
3. Pattern Matching
This approach, which attempts to represent attacks as a pattern or signature able to
be matched against the audit data, is a promising solution for real-time detection. As
events occur, they can be translated into a pattern matched to known intrusion patterns
until a full match is made. This kind of algorithm is efficient and has a low overhead,
thus providing good basis for a real-time system. It also is system-independent since
intrusions are represented as patterns rather than system-specific events or in different
audit trail formats. It can handle multiple attack threads better as each thread can be
processed independently and the results matched across each other to identify a pattern.
However, this method only works with known attacks that can be represented as a well
defined pattern, not a simple task to execute. Also, not all known intrusions can be
translated into patterns, such as spoofing.
4. State Transition Analysis
This method analyzes data, identifying events that transition the system from one
state to the next. The actual transition from one state to the next is protected by a
condition guard. Not only does the event have to occur, but the condition must be met as
well. Once the system has reached an "unsafe" state then it can take action. The
placement of the guarded conditions helps to filter out non-intrusive situations. This
approach is good for detecting cooperative attacks and attacks that span user sessions. A
quantifiable advantage of this methodology with respect to a real-time system is that it is
efficient at predicting the approach of an unsafe state of an attack, thus allowing for
preemptive recourse.
5. Specification-Based Approaches
A new approach being developed by the Department of Computer Science,
University of California, Davis, their idea is different than most traditional misuse
detection methods, focusing on detecting the misuse of executable programs, particularly
in privileged programs that run on UNDC. Traditional methods rely on previous
knowledge about the vulnerabilities in these programs in order to recognize an attack
taking advantage of those vulnerabilities. This new method takes an opposite approach.
It recognizes attacks without requiring any prior knowledge about specific attacks taking
advantage of vulnerabilities, which can be numerous. This method relies on a written
specification based on the desired behavior of the program, the security policy of the
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system and security concepts. Then the actual behavior of the program is monitored for
violations of this specification. This method is similar to anomaly detection, but can be
used specifically to detect misuse situations. This has the obvious advantage of not
having to keep up with documenting all the new types of attack signatures. It can be very
useful in reducing the maintenance overhead of a system.
C. ANOMALOUS BEHAVIOR DETECTION
Detecting deviations from normal behavior of systems requires a different
approach. Anomaly intrusion detection mechanisms makes use of the following schemes.
1. Statistical Analysis
Traditionally the most common approach, this method compares the current
system behavior with previously defined profiles of the system or users. If the current
profile of a user differs significantly from the pre-defined profile, then an intrusion may
be taking place. Probability analysis can be applied to determine this threshold. This
approach does not need to know about the security vulnerabilities of the system as it is
only the deviation from normal behavior that raises a flag. In addition, this approach can
adapt well to changing behavior of the system as newer statistical data on profiles can be
merged into the historical profile data. However, this approach is susceptible to high
false positive and false negative rates depending on how well the threshold levels are set.
Also, it can be fooled by gradually teaching the system to accept inappropriate changes in
behavior.
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2. Predictive Pattern Generation or Rule-Based Detection
This approach assumes that anomalous behavior can be represented as a predictive
pattern. The patterns are represented as rules describing events in a sequence that can
predict the probability of subsequent events occurring. [Ref. 3] gives this example:
E1->E2->E3 => (E4 = 95%, E5 = 5%)
where, if event El is followed by E2 followed by E3, then the probability of E4 occurring
is 95% and the probability of E5 occurring is 5%. This approach adds the additional
aspect of ordering to the analysis, something was missing in the statistical approach. It
also is very adaptive to changes because it can eliminate low quality patterns.
Additionally, it is more efficient in terms of performance and is more resistant to
surreptitious training.
3. Neural Networks
This approach attempts to predict the user's next action based on a previous
window of actions or commands. The network is trained on a representative set of user
commands or actions to determine a profile of that user. The network then attempts to
match the actual user commands against the predicted command based on the stored
profile. The sum of the incorrectly predicted events represents the deviation from normal
behavior. This approach does not depend on any statistical nature of the user's activity
and copes well with noisy or fuzzy data. However, this approach does have some
drawbacks. The reliability of the system is directly dependent on the size of the window
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of previous actions or commands. Too narrow a window will result in a high rate of false
positives and too high a window will introduce too much irrelevant data and may result in
an increase in false negatives. Also, the topology of the network can only be determined
by extensive trial and error. The network is also susceptible to being surreptitiously
trained.
Each one of these methods offers a viable approach to detecting intrusions.
However, no single method is good at detecting all intrusions. Most systems apply only
one or two methods for detection, but it is clear here that it would be preferable for a
system to take advantage of all these methods by applying the best method available for a
specific intrusion type. This is particularly true when applying intrusion detection in a
network of variant environments.
D. WHY DO WE NEED INTRUSION DETECTION?
Why do we need intrusion detection systems in the first place? Why can we not
build completely secure systems that utilize strict authorization methods, cryptographic
encoding schemes on data and very tight access controls to the data? Would this not be
enough? The answer is really no. Sandaram [Ref. 1] offers the following reasoning in
response to these questions:
1) It is not practical to build an entirely secure system. Bug-free software is a
dream that will never happen, therefore our operating systems will be
continuously subjected to potential violations due to buggy software. The
increasing competitive commercial software market has made it the norm to
release buggy software in order to be the first to market, so nobody is
interested in spending the time to make bug-free software. There is no
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practical way to control nor predict the kind of access violations that can result
from buggy software.
2) Cryptography is not absolutely secure. There are ways to break codes. The
more sophisticated and powerful the hardware gets, so goes the increase in
sophistication of the tools for breaking these codes. It is just a matter of time.
3) You cannot adequately protect from inside abuse from those who rightfully
have certain access privileges.
4) The more restrictive a system gets, the more inefficient the users get.
Therefore, users and administrators are not always willing to put up with the
difficulties associated with security.
Traditionally, before the explosive growth of networking, intrusion detection
systems were host-based systems. Host-based systems only protect single systems and if
multiple systems in a network needed protection, then this software had to be installed on
and configured for each machine. In order to alleviate some of the problems with
multiple installations and to catch network level intrusions, network-based systems were
introduced. They usually are a single system on a separate host analyzing collective audit
data from the various hosts or by directly filtering through network packets. Most all of
these systems to date, both host-based and network-based, are large, single-module,
monolithic systems. Thereby presenting some real difficulties,
1) They imposes a significant overhead on the system upon which they run and
the systems being monitored. Quite a bit of processing power is required to
read and analyze all the data that is produced. A single-user, moderately
loaded SunOS 5.4 system can produce up to 100MB of audit data a day [Ref.
1], thus these systems require quite a bit of storage space as well. In addition,
a certain amount of load is required to generate the data by all the systems
being monitored. In addition, the intrusion detection system itself may
produce its own aggregate data and would require additional storage space.
2) They are not very flexible to changes or additions. Adding additional
capability to handle new types of intrusion is no small task. It usually would
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require a re-compile and reinstallation of the entire system module. Not only
is this difficult and time consuming, but it leaves the network vulnerable
during this time.
3) They are not very efficient. Monitoring the entire network requires the work
of a single CPU. As the network traffic increases, so does the data required to
be analyzed, therefore requiring more CPU time
4) They do not scale. As mentioned above, as the network grows, so does the
load on the system. It is possible that this could reach a critical point after
which the system becomes inadequate and the network becomes vulnerable.
5) They are not fault-tolerant. Monolithic systems offer only a single point of
failure. Disrupt that process and you can disable the security system for an
entire network.
E. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
Any good intrusion detection system in a network must meet certain requirements.
The architecture and system design proposed in this thesis intend to satisfy the
requirements. The following applies.
1. Requirement 1: Recognition
The system must recognize initial potentially suspect behavior (the triggering
event). These events obviously equate to the lowest level of alertness; that is, the
measure of the overall threat to the network and its components. These are events that
may raise an eyebrow, but in and of themselves, may not represent anything sinister.
Examples could be a series of unsuccessful logins. A user may have legitimately
forgotten his password, triggering him to contact the system administrator for a new
password (or look in his drawer where he wrote it down!). On the other hand, it might
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represent the first stage in a password guessing scheme. The system should respond by
going into a low level alert and after some time-out period, return to normal if nothing
further suspect occurs. The idea is that this triggering event should result in some low
level monitoring of activity on some or all hosts and that it is in the analysis of the results
of this monitoring that determines the next state of alertness.
The system must also be able to recognize an attack taking place based on a
triggering event of a distributed nature in the network. In other words, the attack may
start out as a series of innocuous events on single hosts, but it is their combination that
raises a flag. For example, an attack may comprise a series of single password guesses on
each host in a network. The single guess on a single host is not enough to warrant
attention, but a series of single guesses from the same source across several hosts within a
short time frame should. The system should be able to recognize an attack of this type.
2. Requirement 2: Escalating Behavior
The system must recognize escalating suspicious behavior on a single host or
across hosts. At each level of alertness, some further activity or lack of it should result in
a change in the state of alertness. At its simplest, the system at any time should either be
at the lowest level of alert, escalating, or returning to the lowest level. More sophisticated
representations of an alert level hierarchy, such as a tree or partial ordering could be used
to better define variations in alertness, but at its simplest, a linear representation should
be provided. System responses should correlate to some combination of alertness level,
system events or activity, and attack type and stage of attack.
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The system must be able to recognize that continuing suspicious behavior is
relevant to a previously established attack thread. An attack thread is defined as the
continuous attack stimulus and system response events that are deemed related and
occurring in order. The system must be able to recognize and establish this relationship
in order to build and maintain a thread. The system then must be able to recognize the
point at which the escalating behavior warrants an upgrade in the alertness level. It may
or may not be necessary to try to follow an attack thread across hosts, but some
recognition is necessary. It might very well be that the system upgrades the level of
alertness when the number of concurrent attack threads of the same type across hosts
reaches a certain threshold. Similarly, the system must be able to recognize that further
related activity, or lack thereof, indicates the attack has subsided and warrants a de-
escalation of alertness.
3. Requirement 3: Communication
The system components on various hosts must communicate with each other,
apprising them of a change in the level of alertness, whether escalating or de-escalating.
In order for the system to recognize escalating suspicious behavior in a networked
environment, any components that may be distributed across hosts must be kept aware of
activity occurring on other hosts. This is important because it is behavior that exists
across hosts that might indicate an escalation in an attack. An attack might be designed
to perform small innocuous attacks across hosts in a round-robin sort of way to avoid
detection. This system must try to recognize such an attempt and make sure that the
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entire system is aware of it. An escalation in alertness will likely result in changes in the
system response and each distributed component must be made aware of it.
4. Requirement 4: Response
The system components must take the correct action that corresponds with a level
of alertness, responding appropriately to changing levels of alertness. A triggering event
may result only in turning on some additional logging or additional monitoring activity.
If the attack thread fails to continue, then these activities can be turned off. If, however, it
is determined the attack is escalating, then the next appropriate response might be to
notify the administrator (email, page, phone call, etc.). And, if the attack reaches a
dangerous level, then the next step in the response might be to kill the processes, disable
an account, or turn off the network access port. In a technically sophisticated system,
some sort of tracking response could be initiated to find and identify the intruder.
Additionally, a good real-time system should allow for preemptive response when
available. Preemptive here means having seized the initiative to thwart an impending
attack. A determination of an existing or potential attack on a system in a network should
be the catalyst for other nodes in the network being notified, resulting in awareness of the
possibility that such an attack may soon be attempted. Thus forewarned, immediate
preemptive measures to minimize the damage that may occur if the attack does take place
can be effected.
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5. Requirement 5: Manual Control
The system must allow for manual intervention in the changing of alertness. This
is particularly important to allow for the de-escalation of alertness after the threat is
eliminated. At any given time, the system must allow for a system administrator to
manually override any state or ongoing operation. In fact, it may be that the appropriate
system response to a level of attack is to wait for a human response. In which case, the
administrator would be manually setting the level. Certainly, a "delete attack thread" or
"reset" function would be desirable.
6. Requirement 6: Adaptability
The system must be highly adaptable to be enable quick responses to the ever
changing methods of attack. This requirement applies to the overall design and
architecture as well as in its operation. Initially, the system must be designed well enough
to be flexible to add additional attack profiles and responses. New avenues of attack are
continuously being applied as new software is added or upgraded to a system or the
invaders get more creative. Once an attack can be recognized and documented, the
system should allow it to be added with minimal effort and automatically applied.
Other changes to the system, such as configuration information, and even software
upgrades, should be able to be automatically applied by propagating these changes
throughout the network. This is necessary to avoid the difficulty of manually applying
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these changes to each host one at a time and to allow for rapid adaptation of the system to
handle new forms of attack.
As the system evolves, it could possibly become sophisticated enough to apply
some sort of artificial intelligence to dynamically identify and learn new forms of attack
as they happen, quickly classify them, and automatically propagate the changes
throughout the network. The system should keep a record of previous attacks, and when
some new suspicious behavior occurs that is similar to a previous intrusion, a flag can be
raised. Previous attacks can act as a knowledge base from which to learn about and
identify potential new forms of attack, providing the ideal situation for minimal human
intervention. However, to what level this can be applied is left to future endeavors.
Initially, the system should allow for manual application of changes.
7. Requirement 7: Concurrency
The system must be able to handle multiple, concurrent attack threads. System
effectiveness requires an ability to handle multiple attack threads occurring at the same
time spawning new component processes if necessary. Attacks may be coming from the
same or different sources and may require different types of response. Multiple attacks
emanating from the same source may in fact indicate a rapid escalation in the alertness
level. The actual number of concurrent attacks may in itself require different types of
response, i.e., alerting the administrator or even major events such as system shutdown or
network cutoff. The system must be able to identify the true source of an attack and
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relate the attack to other separate attacks coming from the same source, as the aggregate
of these attacks may represent a coordinated attack.
8. Requirements: Scaleability
The system must be able to scale as the network grows. The system must be able
to handle any number of hosts and to automatically adapt to additional hosts being added.
The architecture in itself should satisfy this requirement.
9. Requirement 9: Resistance to Compromise of Intrusion Software
Itself
The system must be able to protect itself from unauthorized use or attack. Not
only should the system be performing its mission by protecting systems from outside
attack, but it should be able to protect itself from these same attacks. One of the first
things a serious intruder may do is to attempt to disable the security software, much like a
burglar would disable a home security alarm. Therefore, certain things must be done,
such as encrypting the broadcast messages, protecting from overload, etc.
10. Requirement 10: Efficiency and Reliability
The system should be efficient, reliable, resistant to degradation and run in a
heterogeneous platform environment. These are general terms that apply directly to the
real-time aspects of the system. In order to be effective in real time, the system must
perform well and quickly, be fault-tolerant and resistant to being overloaded.
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11. Requirement 11: Extensibility
The system must be extensible to enable integration of additional intrusion
detection capabilities as they become available, and to incorporate new attack types as
they are discovered. Possibly the best source for becoming informed of new attack types
is through the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) Coordination Center. This
group issues periodic bulletins about new attack types and their methods. They also
provide information about how to handle them which would prove useful in programming
a response.
12. Requirement 12: Flexibility
The system must be flexible in the establishment of security policy and
management across hosts. Many security systems are underutilized because of the
constraints placed upon the system administrators and users. If the solution makes it hard
to use the system, then the system does not get used. An intrusion detection system could
fall into this trap, particularly if policy is set centrally. Many networks cross
organizational boundaries and a centralized approach may not be enforceable. Therefore,
a network intrusion detection system must, at least, allow for decentralized control and
the setting of security policy amongst the hosts in the network.
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F. SUMMARY
This is a fairly demanding set of requirements, that should result in a robust,
efficient and successful network intrusion detection system. In reality, it is nearly
impossible to capture the complete set, as much is still unknown about the nature of
intrusions and their detection, particularly since the set of intrusions itself is not static, but
growing every day. Many have attempted solutions to satisfy some or all of these
requirements utilizing various methods. The next chapter will present some of these




There have been several attempts to satisfy some or all these requirements for an
network intrusion detection system. They all have merits but few have been able to
satisfy all these requirements.
A. NETWORK SECURITY MODEL (NSM) OR NETWORK INTRUSION
DETECTOR (NID)
This system is a LAN based system, consisting of a separate host sitting passively
on a broadcast network monitoring network packets. There are several advantages to this
system with regard to intrusion detection. The machine has immediate access to the
network rather than through audit files, which has a second added benefit of not
burdening the hosts with generating these audit files. Because it sits passively on the
network, it can be invisible, therefore unable to be accessed by an intruder for attack
itself. Also, since it incorporates data from a common, standardized communication
layer, it can be used in a heterogeneous network. Finally, it can better recognize attacks
on the network itself, something that would be difficult for host-based systems to do. On
the other hand, this system only works in broadcast LANs and is not applicable to larger
wide-area network topologies. It also will not scale well. If the network grows or the
amount of network traffic increases, performance will be affected.
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B. NEXT GENERATION INTRUSION-DETECTION EXPERT SYSTEM
(NIDES)
NIDES is an extension of the single host-based system IDES. The hosts in a
network transfer their audit files to a separate machine for central storage and processing
with audit trails then subjected to analysis by a statistical anomaly detector for the
detection of anomalous behavior and a rule-based expert system for detection of misuse.
This kind of system has the advantage of looking for both anomalous and misuse attacks.
However, this system also does not scale well as the machine hosting the NIDES system
could be overburdened. They also do not monitor any network traffic.
C. DOROTHY DENNING'S GENERIC INTRUSION DETECTION MODEL
Denning [Ref. 3] developed a generalized model of an intrusion detection system.
She generalized the detection approach so that it was independent of the system, type of
input and type of intrusions. This model consists of several modules performing specific
tasks. Figure 1 demonstrates. The system contains an Activity Profile which maintains
information about the system's behavior and performs anomaly detection. The Rule Set
maintains the rules and performs the misuse detection. The Event Generator is the
module providing the input (events) regardless of whether their source are audit files,
network packets, etc. This model took the step to generalize the nature of an intrusion
detection system, thus providing the basis for systems that could be platform independent.
Many intrusion detection systems have used this model as their basis, including NIDES.
Different techniques and methods can be applied to any one of these modules depending
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on the actual implementation needed for the system or on other independent criteria.
However, not all methods fit well into this type of model, such as neural networks or
model-based approaches.









Generate New Profiles Dynamically
Clock
Figure 1. Dorothy Denning's Generic Intrusion Detection Model. After Ref. [3]
D. ADAPTIVE INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (AID)
Utilizing a client-server architecture to communicate from a central intrusion
detection monitor to various server agents sitting on hosts in a network, each server agent
translates generated audit data into a platform-independent format, thus enabling
applicability in a heterogeneous network. The manager performs the security
administration by polling the various server agents for audit data, passing it to an expert
system for analysis and returning any decisions made. This system has the advantages of
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working in a heterogeneous network and supports real-time decision making and
response. It can scale moderately well as the agents can be distributed, but the single host
detection system might not. Additionally, it only monitors for misuse and ignores
anomaly detection, although that portion is under consideration for future development.
Figure 2 outlines the architecture.
Expert System
Host Host
Figure 2. Adaptive Intrusion Detection System. After Ref. [4]
E. DISTRIBUTED RECOGNITION AND ACCOUNTABILITY (DRA )
Not a system, but a technique for identifying the source (user) of attacks
throughout the network as proposed by Ko et al. [Ref. 5], this particular method can be
very useful in identifying cooperative attacks. This technique requires a centralized
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expert system to apply the algorithm to audit files sent there from various hosts. This
could be very useful in an architecture, as proposed in this thesis. Since it might be
difficult, if not impossible, for individual hosts to recognize cooperative attacks, a
separate system running the algorithm could be responsible for seeking these out. Then it
could message the affected hosts with an alert message. This algorithm is designed to
observe the ways an individual moves around in the network taking into account the
changing of use names to hide his identity. This is the distributed recognition part. The
second part is to associate all instances of this user by tying them together with a common
identifier. This is the accountability part. This identifier can be added as part of the alert
message to aid in keeping track of the activity of this user throughout the network.
F. DISTRIBUTED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (DIDS)
Mukherjee et al. [Ref. 6] proposed a distributed system, which basically is an
extension of NSM or NID to a wide-area heterogeneous network topology. One of the
first to take into account the distributed nature of some attacks across multiple hosts in a
wide-area network, it also is one of the first to take extensibility into account in the
architecture and to distribute the load across the various hosts.
This architecture essentially distributes monitoring activity amongst the various
hosts. These monitors send "reports" of suspicious activity to a centralized director for
analysis by an expert system. In addition, the LAN monitor sends its own "reports" to the
director. The director can analyze the collective data looking for cooperative attacks.
This system has the advantage of distributing some of its load across systems and is also
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extensible as additional monitors or tools can be added to the configuration as long as the
adhere to a standard communication protocol. It is somewhat scaleable, as new monitors
can be added as new hosts are added, but the director could possibly be overwhelmed
with data, thus limiting its scaleability. It is possible that multiple directors could be
added to mitigate this load. However, this system does not provide for real-time response
to detected intrusions, but its extensibility could allow for the addition of incident
handling tools to provide for real-time response. Also, the separation of activities, i.e.,
monitoring, analysis, response, throughout the network away from the hosts upon which
an attack may be occurring may delay such response to the point where it might be too
late. Figure 3 shows a diagram of this architecture.
Monitor
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Figure 3. Distributed Intrusion Detection System. After Ref. [6]
30
G. GRAPH BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (GRIDS)
The Department of Computer Science at University of California, Davis has
proposed an interesting approach to an intrusion detection system. [Ref. 7] This system
was specifically designed to detect intrusions in large networks. Its intention was to
directly address the scaling issue. It focuses on detecting network-based attacks like
worms, sweeps and coordinated attacks, but can detect intrusions on individual hosts.
The key to solving the scaling issue is its hierarchical architecture. Figure 4 outlines the
architecture.
GRIDS represents network attacks as a connected graph where the nodes in the
graph are the hosts or departments and the edges represent the activity between them.
Each graph represents a connected set of events on the network. The nodes and edges
have attributes that contain additional information about that attack. As the attack
continues, the graph grows until some threshold is met; that is, either the graph has
reached a particular determining event or has reached a determining size, indicating an
attack. Different kinds of graphs are needed to represent differing types of attacks and are
constructed from rule sets that specify how these graphs are built and what the thresholds
are. The architecture consists of a hierarchy of departments, with each department
containing hosts and/or departments. Additionally, there is a software manager which
manages the hierarchy, and a graph engine which maintains the graphs. Each host
contains a data source and a module controller. The data source are modules that monitor
activity on a host or in the network, and can be anything that supplies data about
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intrusions, including host-based intrusion detection systems, network sniffers, LAN
monitors or any other security tool providing data about a possible attack. The data
source sends information about an intrusive activity to the graph engine in its department
in the form of a node or edge on a graph. The graph engine makes a determination, using
a set of rules, to include it in an existing graph or form a new one. The graph engine then
sends summaries of those graphs to the graph engine of its parent department which
subsequently repeats the process, but maintaining a graph at a coarser resolution. This
system has the advantage of being scaleable, extensible and flexible. It handles detection











Figure 4. Graph Based Intrusion Detection System. After Ref. [7]
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H. CROSBIE AND SPAFFORD'S AUTONOMOUS AGENTS
Crosbie and Spafford of the COAST project at Purdue University propose an
system that offers the most promise. [Ref. 8] This approach is the one that most closely
resembles the approach offered in this thesis, although there are significant differences.
However, the main thrust of the architecture is the same. The system is distributed across
the network via a system of autonomous agents cooperating with each other to detect
intrusions within the network.
The advantages offered are very much the same as offered with the architecture
described in this thesis, mainly scaleability, extensibility, efficiency, fault tolerance and
resistance to degradation. However, this system focuses on delegating the functionality
separately to the various agents. Each agent is only responsible for monitoring a small
subset of activity, but at the network level. The agents look directly at the network level
rather than for behavior on a specific host. So the load is definitely distributed here. This
system also differs in that it adds a learning element. These agents must be trained to
know how to seek out anomalous behavior in the network, so a training module is added
to the architecture. This type of training could easily be added to the system proposed in
this thesis as well. This system also provides for cooperative messaging between agents
and carries the idea of varying levels of suspicion.
It differs from other intrusion detectors that work at the network level in that it
operates on a wide-area network using TCP/IP protocol as opposed to most that work
only in local area networks using a broadcast protocol. However, it appears this system is
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extensible enough to permit other types of monitoring to be added. Although this system
claims fault tolerance; that is, the agent can be restarted at any time retaining state, this is
not entirely true. While the state can be restored, the system is vulnerable during the
down time. That particular functionality is not being performed throughout the system.
True fault tolerance is achieved through redundancy in a real-time system and should




Raw Network Layer (DLPI)
Figure 5. Crosbie and Spafford's Autonomous Agents System. After Ref. [8]
34
I. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented some past and current work in the attempt to build a
robust yet successful intrusion detection system. Most have been moderately complete in
meeting the requirements for a successful intrusion detection system. The next chapter
will outline my solution: The Distributed Autonomous Agent Network Intrusion
Detection and Response System.
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IV. ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN
A. A PROPOSED SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Figure 6 below is a simplified diagram of the proposed system architecture.
Independent, autonomous agents sit atop various host machines in a network,









Figure 6. Distributed Autonomous Agent Network Intrusion Detection and
Response System
The hosts are definite sites on the network, while the tools and centralized data
collection may or may not reside on a network site. If they indeed are hosted on a
network site, then the hosts upon which they reside would benefit from having an agent
run there as well.
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The agents are the main components of the system. They are processes that run
on each host, monitor that host for intrusive activity and communicate with each other in
a coordinated response to this activity. They are written and compiled specifically for the
platform upon which they sit. They all share the same software module design but the
actual implementations of the various methods are written to deal with intrusions as they
occur within their particular environment, that is the operating system, application
software, etc. of that particular platform. These agents run independently of each other.
Their design is detailed in Section 6 of this chapter.
The Network Identification Tool is a separate mechanism used to recognize
coordinated attacks that might be distributed throughout the network. It would be used to
attempt to recognize that seemingly different users are actually coming from the same
source, but may be attempting to masquerade their attack by distributing it across multiple
sessions and/or user accounts. Alert messages generated from host monitors may be
filtered through this tool to attempt to associate it with an ongoing coordinated attack.
This is further discussed in Section 5 of this chapter.
Centralized data collection provides a central location where certain activities on
various hosts can be recorded and accessed by any host in the network allowing for the
recognition of those kind of attacks that are distributed in nature. Any host can act as the
monitor for these types of attacks.
There are many other tools that exist in the intrusion detection world that could be
useful if combined with the distributed monitoring on the hosts. LAN monitors, expert
systems, intruder recognition and accountability, and intruder tracing tools are examples
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of some that could be very useful as augmentations to basic host monitoring
infrastructure. These tools must work within the constraints of the architecture, mainly
by utilizing the common communication mechanisms involved. This may mean some
modifications to build an API to the communication layer.
The rest of this chapter will specify a system utilizing this architecture focusing on
the attack hierarchy, alert level hierarchy, agent design and communication between
agents.
B. FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION
This thesis will describe the design of a based on Figure 6. In doing so, the
proposal contained herein will hopefully satisfy the requirements of a good intrusion
detection system as described in the Requirements Analysis section of this thesis.
1. Attack Taxonomy
To make an intrusion detection system more flexible and extensible, it is desirable
to establish an attack classification hierarchy. This accomplishes several things:
1) By abstracting details of attacks out of a higher layer of classification,
generalization can be applied at the higher levels and the details left to the
lower levels. This allows for a classification of attacks that can be applied
across various platforms, where the details of how a particular attack's
behavior on differing systems can be left to the lower levels.
2) Classification on type of attack rather than the techniques for monitoring them
(the traditional way) allows for better recognition of these attacks from their
manifestations in the audit records.
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3) Generalizing common traits of attacks provides a basis (process of
elimination) for more efficient algorithms to identify types of attacks.
4) Classification allows for better conceptualization and understanding of attacks
and how they are interrelated.
5) Classification provides for better extensibility of the system by making it
easier to add new attack types to the hierarchy, particularly when the behavior
of a known attack varies slightly as intruders try new avenues. This way new
behaviors can be added to the classification without losing or confusing
previously defined information.
It is generally recognized that all intrusions fall into either one of two basic high
level categories. They are Misuse and Anomalous Behavior. Misuse comprises attacks
that are already known and whose behavior can be specified. These types of attacks are
ones that have been previously recognized and documented. Therefore, recognizing the
existence of an attack would involve simply comparing current behavior against a set of
pre-defined attack scenarios. If a match occurs, then you have a likely attack. Matching
behavior occurring early in the scenario would indicate a potential, but maybe not
absolute, attack. As the attack continues to match as it progresses through later stages of
the scenario, the more likely this type of attack is occurring. System responses can occur
through various stages of this matching process.
Misuse intrusions can be categorized by type of attack. The following represents




3) Penetration of the security control system
4) Leakage
5) Denial of Service
6) Malicious use
Sandeep Kumar [Ref. 9] offers a very good classification scheme. Intrusions can
be represented by an event or series of events. It is the relationship of these events to one
another that provides the basis to recognize differing attack types. He offers four higher
level classifications of attack types under which the above types can be placed:
1) Existence of Changes in System State: This type concentrates on the
existence of events that vary the state of the system. This type usually
involves examining system resources, such as the file system, for particular
changes in state. Examples may be a change in permissions on protected files,
the existence of particular files, or changes in the content or format of
particular files. Many of the intrusions that are not recorded in audit trails can
be classified here.
2) Sequential Patterns of Events: The specific sequence of events may specify a
possible intrusion. Kumar further breaks this category down to subtypes,
Interval and Duration. The Interval subtype covers events that happen within
a specified time interval. The Duration subtype covers events that exist or
occur for not more or not less than a specified interval of time. An example of
an Interval subtype would be race condition attacks and an example of a
Duration subtype would be a password guessing attack (repeated login failures
within a specified time).
3) Regular Expression Patterns of Events: This type covers attacks that involve
events that must occur jointly, but not in any specific order. For example
event A happened AND event B happened AND event C happened, but not
necessarily in any particular order.
4) Other Patterns: This is the "catchall" classification of attack patterns that do
not fall in the above top level categories. Kumar suggests these further sub-
classifications.
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• Patterns that require embedded negation: This covers attacks that
represented by the failure of an event to occur when expected.
• Patterns that involve generalized selection: A match on an attack occurs if
a selected subset of events occur out of a specified superset of events, i.e.,
that any x-2 events occurred out of a set of x events.
Care must be taken to handle multiple inheritance issues. For example, an attack
may comprise traits from both Sequence and RE Pattern types. Event A and Event B
must happen in a certain sequence, but may be meaningless unless Event C happened at
some time before or after. One should attempt to classify attacks of this nature under the
most appropriate hierarchy, but may actually be classified under both to enable more
efficient and responsive algorithms. On the other hand, the occurrence of multiple
inheritance strongly suggests a poor hierarchy, in which case, the above suggested
classification may not be particularly useful. It may be more appropriate to use the less
general higher-level classifications than proposed by Kumar.
Anomalous Behavior describes those kinds of attacks that may not fall into any
know misuse category, but can be detected by use of the system resources that fall out of
the ordinary. Usually, this kind of behavior is measured via statistical methods that
capture information about a user on a system and develops a profile of that user's
behavior. This requires the existence of a profile generator which can continuously
observe and update a user's profile. When behavior is observed that significantly
deviates from the normal behavior, then the system can respond accordingly. Some
threshold value must be established that would represent the probability of an attack
occurring based upon the extent of the deviation from the norm of a behavior.
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Anomalous intrusions can be categorized on types of behavior. Sandeep Kumar
[Ref. 9] offers the following representation of some of the category hierarchy:
1) Activity intensity rate: The measure of the rate at which an activity is
progressing. This can be used to detect unusual bursts in behavior deviating
from the norm for a profile.
2) Audit record distribution of particular activities: Measures the distribution of
activities over the entire system usage. Looks unusual clustering of activity
types.
3) Categorical distribution of activities: Measures the distribution of a particular
activity over categories. For example, it may measure the relative usage of a
particular piece of software.
4) Ordinal measurable activities: Measures activity quantifiable in numeric
form, such as the amount of CPU time used by a user.
Figure 7 below shows a graphical representation of the attack hierarchy. The














Figure 7. Intrusion Attack Class Hierarchy.
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2. Alert level hierarchy
Establishing the seriousness of potential and ongoing attacks in a network requires
a little more thought than just a simple hierarchy based on the danger level of each attack.
While a potential attack is obviously relevant to the machine upon which it occurs, it may
not be relevant to all the other machines in its network environment. A hierarchy of alert
levels can be used to measure this relevancy. The alert level represents, more or less, the
relative importance of notifying other agents on other computers in a network of a
particular attack scenario taking place on a single node in the same network so that these
other agents can take preemptive or reactive measures. In this way, the agents in the
system can cooperate with each other in recognizing and handling an attack. There appear
to be two main factors which can be used to quantify the alert level of a particular stage in
an attack; that is, danger and transferability.
The danger can be defined as the potential damage that can occur if the attack at a
particular stage is allowed to continue, and is measured by comparing the kind and stage
of an attack against the frequency of false positives. The transferability can be defined as
the applicability of an attack in other nodes in a network, and assessed by comparing the
kind of attack against the existence of similar operating environments (OS and software
in which the attack occurs) in the network.
The danger and transferability values can be defined independently for each
identified stage in a particular attack. These values may or may not change over various
stages of an attack. Their product can be used to determine the Alert Level of an attack in
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a network, and Appropriate system responses can be broken up and distributed across
these Alert Levels. One of these responses is the notification to other machines in the
network of an attack so that they can take an appropriate response or ignore it. Other
responses may be to notify an administrator, start logging certain activities, or taking
action to halt the attack.
The formula for determining the value of the Alert Level will be thus:
Alert Level .= Danger * Transferability
Danger values are:
1) (1) Minimal: The event cannot be deterministically associated with a known
attack, but could be an early stage of some known attack profile or could be
the early stage of some anomalous behavior.
2) (2) Cautionary: The event indicates a secondary or later stage of a known
attack, but one that still cannot be determined to be part of a known attack. It
may also be the result of an accumulation of anomalous behavior having
increased from the minimal stage, but not enough for serious concern or the
event does determine a known attack, but the potential damage of the attack is
minimal.
3) (3) Noticeable: The event definitely identifies a known attack with moderate
damage potential or the accumulation of anomalous behavior has reached a
level where it is likely that some hostile action is taking place.
4) (4) Serious: The event definitely identifies a known attack with high damage
potential or the accumulation of anomalous behavior has reached a point that
it is either disrupting service or is highly indicative that an attack is occurring
with serious consequences.
5) (5) Catastrophic: The event identifies a known attack that, if left to continue,
may result in catastrophic losses.
Transferability values are:
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1) (1) None - The attack or potential attack is occurring in an environment
unique in the network. There are no other environments like it that could see a
similar attack or be part of the same attack. In other words, there are no other
similar operating systems, like software in which the attack is occurring, or a
combination of both.
2) (2) Partial - The attack is occurring in a common operating environment or
common piece of software, but the version of which may be different enough
that applicability may be questionable. More simply stated, the vulnerability
to a particular attack may be due to a deficiency in a particular version of
operating system or software.
3) (3) Full - The attack is occurring in a operating environment or piece of
software that is common across the network. Other systems in the network are
definitely vulnerable to the same attack.
Taking the product of Danger and Transferability results in a range of Alert Level
values from one to 15. The system response to a particular attack at some stage of the
attack can be tied directly to this value. For example, if the system recognizes a particular
attack, it will determine the danger and transferability values applicable to that stage of
the attack, find their product, and respond in a manner whose definition is tied to the
value of the product. It is possible there could eventually be as many different responses
as there are possible values as the system becomes more sophisticated. In fact a neural
net could be trained to assign better, non-integer values to Danger and Transferability
resulting in more precise Alert Level values that better reflect expert opinion as to what
the proper Alert Levels should be at varying stages of an attack. However, initially, there
will likely be less variation as the response will be tied to a discrete range of values. In
general, the actual system response will be determined by the type of attack in addition to
the alert level value. Therefore, the only response that can absolutely be generalized is
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the need to notify other nodes in the network. So, the system response can be described
as follows:
The following are responses assigned to discrete Alert Level value ranges and the
thresholds are arbitrarily defined based on intuition. Training and experience can be
applied over time to determine better thresholds and responses.
1) (1-5): no notification to other nodes is necessary.
2) (6-10): Partial notification to other nodes is performed. Notification is sent to
only the nodes that are determined to be relevant or where the relevancy is
non-deterministic. This may result in notification of all nodes, particularly in
the case where the danger and transferability values are both three. Full
notification may also result if the restricted set of nodes cannot be determined
from the node registry.
3) (11-15): Full notification to other nodes is performed. The only time values
can fall into this range are when they apply to all nodes in the network and the
danger level is at least serious.
Another consideration in defining the level of alertness in the system is the
concept of widespreadness. Widespreadness can be defined as the extent to which an
attack has spread throughout the network. This value may not have as much importance
as the danger and transferability values, but should at least reflect whether the attack has
indeed spread away from a single host in the network. First impression is to add this as
an additional factor in the determination of the Alert Level value. However, that would
result in a much wider range of values over which to distribute the responses and would
make it difficult to come up with meaningful values with respect to the response choices.
It might make more sense to treat this as an independent variable with only two values: 1
for no spreading and 2 for having spread to more than one host. Then the appropriate
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response might be to notify all hosts if a value of 2 is reached. This value when
combined with the Alert Level value might result in more stringent responses if this
attack continues to spread than if widespreadness was not factored in at all.
3. Thresholds
One consideration is for the regulation of false positives and false negatives. The
system does not want to be "crying wolf all the time, but on the other hand, does not
want to overlook any real attacks. Therefore, some form of threshold needs to be
established against which to make a determination to take action or to send out
notifications. One such mechanism for determining this might be to use the concepts of
precision and recall. These values can be determined by observing the system behavior
during some form of testing phase. The recall can be determined to be the value of the
number of attacks that actually were recognized out of the number of attacks that actually
occurred. The precision value can be measured by determining the number of true attacks
out of those that were identified as attacks, as opposed to false alarms. Once good
estimates of these values can be determined for each attack type, then they can be used to
determine the threshold against which to take action. Increasing the threshold for an alert
category usually decreases recall, but increases precision. So an expert could adjust the
thresholds for the best tradeoff in their opinion or according to what policies he or his
organization has set forth.
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4. Network Identification
One of the most challenging parts of identifying attacks in a network is
recognizing coordinated attacks. Often times an intruder may want to deceive traditional
intrusion detection tools by distributing his attack across multiple sessions and/or
multiple users. Each event in and of itself may not be recognizable as anything out of the
ordinary. However, taken in aggregation, they may indeed be the components of a
coordinated attack. An example of such an attack is the Doorknob attack. An intruder
attempts to gain access to hosts in the network by trying various common account and
password combinations on each host. Rather than sitting on a particular host and
continuously repeating the attempt until successful or until a lockout occurs, he will try it
a couple of times, move on to another host and repeat the attempt, etc. The intruder
persists until he succeeds, much like a burglar walking down a hallway rattling the door
of various apartments until he finds one unlocked. The rattles he makes are basically
unnoticeable, so he is less likely to get caught, similar to the attempted logins. If an
intruder keeps the number of attempts to a minimum on each host, this would fall into
normal behavior and not be recognized. But if the aggregation of all these attempts were
known, then it would be obvious that an attack was taking place.
In order to recognize attacks of this sort, some mechanism must be applied to
recognize that each one of these attacks are coming from the same source, even if he has
attempted to masquerade himself by changing user names. It might be difficult for each
host to relay enough information to other hosts about the user so that these other hosts can
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associate an alert with a current user or attack taking place in its environment. It may be
necessary to filter these alert messages through a separate Network identification tool
that can resolve these users down to a common network identifier. Then, this tool can
keep track of possible coordinated attacks.
Ko et al. [Ref. 5] has devised an algorithm for distributed recognition and
accountability that could prove useful for performing this association. Such an algorithm
could be run on a separate host to perform analysis to recognize coordinated attacks and
send out alerts to affected hosts as necessary. Also, the various hosts that generate their
own alert messages could filter these through this tool to see if a particular attack can be
associated with any suspected ongoing coordinated attacks. Then a network identifier
could be attached to any further alert messages to further keep track of a particular
intruder's activity.
5. Communications
In order for the agents to communicate, a communication protocol must be
established. The main reasons for providing a communication mechanism between
agents is to provide for preemptive response to intrusions and to perform cooperative
recognition of certain types of attacks. Certainly, each host can respond to a potential
attack it discovers in its own environment, but once an attack is discovered, the damage
may be done. It would be better to respond to potential attacks before they occur. If a
system could be notified by an alert that the potential for an attack is imminent, then the
system might be able to take some protective measures beforehand. Therefore, it is
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necessary for the nodes in the network to notify each other of potential attacks via alert
messages containing information about the level and type of alert as described above in
the section on Alert Levels. Each agent could then be configured to take whatever
preemptive response it deems necessary, including specialized activity logging or
lowering the thresholds against which to respond.
Also, there are certain types of attacks, such as doorknob rattling or sweep attacks
that would be difficult to recognize on a single host. With the absence of a network
monitor in this system, but which could be added at any time due to the extensible nature
of the system, these types of attacks might go unnoticed. However, if an agent receives
an alert suggesting a potential attack of this type, then its existence could be confirmed by
the existence of further evidence on the machine that received the alert. Eventually, one
of these agents might send out an alert confirming the attack, at which point all the nodes
in the network could respond immediately to the threat.
How often and under what conditions messages are sent can be configured on
each host when defining the appropriate response to events. Generally, new messages
may be generated upon the change in Alert Level of an attack or upon the introduction of
new intrusive activity. If messages are generated whenever something new is detected,
then this could result in an overload of messages, particularly to busier machines. So,
new messages should only be generated when the new intrusive activity has reached a
particular threshold that is meaningful for that attack type. This concept has already been
discussed in the responses associated with the various Alert Level ranges as described in
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Section 2 of this chapter. The number of messages generated and to which machines are
a function of the Alert Level.
One obvious problem associated with communications between the hosts is
availability. If a host is unavailable to receive or send messages, it degrades the
effectiveness of the intrusion detection system. Reasons for unavailability vary from
planned downtime to being a victim of a denial of service attack. The former does not
present any problem as the host is not subject to any compromise to an attack at that time,
but the latter does indeed present a problem and knowledge of this attack needs to be
made known to the other hosts in the network. If the host is unavailable, then it might not
be able to send any messages notifying others of the ongoing attack. Also, if the host
becomes unavailable for more benign reasons, it still needs to receive and send messages
concerning other intrusion attacks. Therefore, the relative importance of sending and
receiving message should increase with the increase in load on a host. This would make
sure that, at the very least, messages will transfer properly.
However, it is possible that a host could become so overloaded that it is
completely unavailable to send and receive messages and that fact needs to get out to
raise the Alert Levels in other hosts in the network so they can protect themselves against
a potential denial of service attack, even if it is eventually discovered that an attack of
this type was not the true cause of the unavailability. This can be done by having all
computers periodically send "I'm still running" messages to one another so that the
absence of one of these messages would act as a positive message indicating a potential
denial of service attack and result in raising the Alert Levels of other computers with
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regard to this kind of attack. The frequency of these messages should not be too great so
as to add an unnecessary increase in the message traffic.
In addition, there may be other types of messages that are broadcast. Certainly,
messages indicating a change in alertness state are needed. But additional ones may be
necessary, such as changing configuration settings or product upgrades, adding additional
hosts to the host file, or requesting additional information from hosts, all dependent on
the actual implementation of the various methods in the agents. A security feature must
also be added to this protocol to protect this system from an attack itself, such as an
encrypted identifier. The following illustrates a proposal for the information contained in
an alert message between agents.
1) Generating Host: Identifies the host machine generating the message and
upon which the suspected attack is occurring.
2) Alert Level: The alert level value as determined by the product of the Danger
and Transferability.
3) Attack Type: Identifies the attack object class.
4) Network ID: The network identifier for the source of the attack if that can be
determined. It should probably contain some sort of type identifier to indicate
at what level this identifier is being generated, that is, either from a host
monitor of from a separate network identification tool.
5) Security Code: An encrypted identifier (such as a PGP key) that would ensure
that this message is coming from a host within the system and is not being
spoofed.
Various designs could be made to enact this protocol. Certainly a broadcast type
would be the most useful. But on a TCP/IP network, it would require a point to point
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protocol. Therefore, a host name file probably needs to be kept and maintained by each
host in the network so that the agent would know to which machines to send the
messages.
6. Agent design
As new intrusions are discovered and documented, their handling needs to be
added to the system with a minimum of interruption. Ideally, the system need not go
down at all, but only the relevant piece be updated or added. This is possible in an
object-oriented design where the agent software is broken down into component modules.
The interfaces between the modules remain the same, but only the implementations of the
methods need to be changed. So, if the handling of a particular attack changes over time,
only the algorithm written to handle the attack in that particular attack module need be
changed without affecting the rest of the system. Figure 8 provides an example of the
object model of the agent design using the OMT methodology notation. [Ref. 10] The
forks below the rectangles represent inheritance.
This object model is likely incomplete, most likely lacking all the necessary
attributes and methods to make it fully functional. This would have to be completed in a
full fledged development process, which has not been applied here. The following offers
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Figure 8. Object Model of Autonomous Agent Design
1) Communication Interface: This is an abstract superclass for the two types of
communications that will occur, i.e., receiving or sending messages. It is not
meant to be instantiated.
2) Listener: This is a subclass of Communication Interface. This class
represents the piece of the software that listens for and receives incoming
messages from other agents. It then processes them according to the type of
attack described in the message by calling the class method alertRespond() on
the Attack object class.
3) Sender: This is a subclass of Communication Interface. This class represents
the piece of software that sends messages (alerts) to other agents. It knows
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how to package the alert, identify the locations of other agents, and call the
network software to send the message.
4) Intrusion Attack: This is the abstract superclass for all attack types. It is in
here that the common attributes and methods for all intrusion types are placed,
danger and transferability are attributes used to determine the alert levels of
notification messages and whose values can possibly change, especially
danger, with variations in the stage of an attack. The stage attribute is an
internal attribute used to keep track of the various stages of an attack. It is the
changes in this value that would trigger changes to the danger value, which, in
turn, would change the alert level for that attack and possibly trigger
additional responses. It also would provide visibility to an administrator to the
current stage of an attack. Recall and precision are likely to be static values
set by administrators regulating the threshold for responses. This may be
redundant as recall and precision are functions of one another and only one
value may need to be stored. The method respond() is the method defined to
respond to an internal change in alert level and alertRespond() is a static
method defined to respond to receipt of alert level messages for attacks of that
type.
5) Misuse: This is a further specialization of Intrusion Attack that covers all
attack types that fit into the misuse category.
6) Anomaly: This is a further specialization of Intrusion Attack that covers all
attack types that fit into the anomaly category.
7) Attempted Break in, Activity Intensity, etc. These are the finer grained
subclasses of Misuse and Anomaly that specify all the various attack types. It
is here that the specific handling requirements are implemented, overriding
any general implementations that may have been implemented at the
superclass level. It is intended that the number and identity of these classes be
dynamic and new ones added as needed. It is possible a class at this level may
indeed represent a generalization to further subclasses, depending on the
attack type defined. Objects at this level will communicate with the Listener
portion of the Communications Interface to pass it information needed to
create an alert to send to other agents.
8) Misuse Detector: This is one of the main components of the agent software.
It will be responsible for monitoring the system resources and audit files to
seek out and identify possible attacks. If it finds one, it will instantiate an
object of the appropriate class and maintain its state and call the appropriate
method to handle the suspected intrusion.
56
9) Anomaly Detector: Sister to the Misuse Detector. It will be responsible for
monitoring the system resources for anomalous behavior. It calls the Profile
of various accounts to compare itself to the stored Profile. If the current
profile is differing significantly, then anomalous behavior is occurring. It will
then instantiate an object of the appropriate class and maintain its state and
call the appropriate method to handle the suspected intrusion.
10) Profile Generator: This represents another workhorse of the agent software.
It continuously monitors the system resources and audit files to maintain the
state of the current profile and to periodically merge the current profile into
the stored profile.
11) Profile: This class represents an abstract superclass to two types of profiles,
the current profile of a system account, and the stored profile of an account.
12) Current Profile: This class represents the current profile of a particular system
account. Current implies that it represents only the profile generated for some
determined period of time up to and including the current time. That length of
time can be variable, depending on what value best returns a valid profile that
can be compared against the stored profile with some confidence. This class
is called by the Anomaly Detector to compare itself to the stored class and
return information specifying whether the current behavior has deviated
enough from the stored profile to represent a possible attack.
13) Stored Profile: This class represents the stored profile of a particular system
account. This is the historical, statistical record of an account's behavior
against which the current profile can be compared to determine whether the
current behavior is anomalous. This profile needs to be updated by merging in
the current profile data at periodic points, probably whenever the current
profile is updated with new data itself.
Each of these agents is responsible for monitoring the activity on a single host in
the network seeking to identify single-host attacks as well as components of network-
wide attacks occurring on that host. This monitoring occurs within the Misuse and
Anomaly Detectors. Once an attack has been identified, an occurrence of it is instantiated
from the attack class hierarchy and maintained by that agent through continued
monitoring and through coordination with the other agents in the system through
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communication via alert level messages. When an agent receives an alert level message
via its Communication Interface, it calls a static method called alertRespond() belonging
to the attack class relevant to that alert level message. It is in this method where the
decision making occurs on how to respond to receiving that message. Preemptive
response would be implemented here as well as changing the state of relevant attack
objects that exist on that host.
7. Example Intrusion Scenario
To demonstrate an example of how this design might be put to use, I will describe
a potential implementation and illustrate how an attack might be handled. In this
example I will illustrate the identification and response to a Doorknob Rattling attack in a
network. This particular attack will be coordinated; that is, a simultaneous sweep from
multiple sources. This utilizes two features enabling the intruder to stay hidden. First,
the sweep portion allows the intruder to not raise suspicion at any given period of time
and the multiple sources hinders the recognition of an association between simultaneous
events. Figure 9 shows the layout of a small, sample network.
In this example, Host 1 and Host 2 are UNIX platforms running an autonomous
agent, while Host 3 is a Windows NT platform running an autonomous agent. Host 4 is a
UNIX platform running a network monitor. Each of these hosts communicate with each
other using the sockets mechanism provided with the operating system using the TCP/IP
protocol to transfer the messages. The listener is a daemon process that retrieves
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messages coming into a TCP/IP port on a host. This listener passes the information in the


























Figure 9. Example Network Subjected to Doorknob Attack
Each host with an agent is configured identically for handling of doorknob
attacks; that is:
1) Respond to notifications of this attack type with alert level values of 6-10 by
monitoring logins more closely (run a special process to do this) and
accumulate evidence.
2) Respond to notifications of this attack type with alert level values of 1 1-15 by
paging the system administrator.
3) Respond to continued attempts on that host, at least six, while alert level is in
a state of 6-10 by raising the danger level to three.
4) Respond to a successful illegal login on that host by raising the danger level to
a value of four.
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5) Relevant operating systems are UNIX and Windows NT.
While not shown in detail in this example, it is assumed that precision and recall
values have been previously determined to set the thresholds as just specified. The host
with the monitor is configured to respond to an identification of a potential doorknob
attack by setting the danger level to a value of two. Each host has a host file (could be a
single file on a shared drive) with information about the other hosts in the network that
looks like the following:
1) Host_l: OS: UNIX Type: Agent
2) Host_2: OS: UNIX Type: Agent
3) Host_3: OS: Windows NT Type: Agent
4) Host_4: OS: UNIX Type: Monitor
An attack scenario in this environment might go as follows. The LAN monitor on
Host 4 recognizes that multiple attempts to login to various hosts are originating from the
same source. An instance of a Doorknob Attack subclass in the Intrusion Attack
hierarchy (not shown in Figure 8, but presumed to be part of the hierarchy as defined for
this system) is created by the agent's Misuse Detector interfacing with the LAN Monitor
on the same host. The Misuse Detector knows when to create this instance via its
interfacing with the LAN Monitor. It then determines that the danger level of the newly
created Doorknob Attack object has a value of two, since it is not absolutely positive this
is an actual attack and the system has been configured respond this way. Then the Misuse
Detector determines which machines would be affected. In this case, it would be all of
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the machines, as both UNIX and Windows NT operating systems have login functions.
The Misuse Detector then sets the transferability value on the Doorknob Attack object to
three since all machines in the network are being affected, indicating an Alert Level of
six. This implies partial notification, meaning only those machines which are relevant
need to be notified. The Misuse Detector then calls the respond() method of the
Doorknob Attack object and this method causes notification to occur by sending
messages to all the hosts in the host file that are relevant; that is, whose operating systems
are UNIX or Windows NT. But in this case, all the nodes are relevant, so they all will be
notified.
When each host gets the notification, it responds to that Alert Level based on how
the response was configured for that host. In this example, all the hosts are configured
identically. So, the message is received via the socket mechanism residing on a network
port of each host machine. This socket forks a process to handle receipt of that message.
This process passes the information in the message to the Listener object in the agent via
its receive() method. The Listener object then calls the alertRespond() static method of
the Doorknob Attack class to handle the response to this alert message. The response in
this case will be for each host to monitor the logins on itself more closely to determine if
further logins continue to come from the same source and to start accumulating evidence
of this attack. Host 1 sees six more attempted logins on its machine and therefore raises
the danger level to three since it was configured to respond in this way. The attack is
almost surely determined, but the seriousness of the consequences are not great. Just
logging in causes no damage if stopped there. The transferability level remains the same.
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So, the Alert Level now is raised to nine. Messages are sent out from Host 1 to Host 2
and Host 3. However, Host 2 recognizes an actual successful login from this source and
the danger level is raised to four to indicate "very serious." With the Alert Level now at
twelve, it is placed into the highest category, meaning that all hosts will receive a
notification. So, Host 2 sends a notification to Host 1 and Host 3 and immediately takes
action to page its administrator. When Host 1 and Host 3 get a notification with an Alert
Level of 12, they too page their respective administrators. The administrators would then
take whatever action they deem necessary. This would end the current scenario.
Alternatives exist for some of the actions in this scenario. Receipt of the
notification at an Alert Level of 12 might have been handled by sending a notification to a
firewall to filter out all packets coming from this source. Or it might be sent to a tool to
start tracing the actual source of the attack. This system can be extended or modified at
any time by changing the configurations at each host to reflect differing approaches in
responding to events.
C. SUMMARY
The Distributed Autonomous Agent Network Intrusion Detection and Response
System, as just proposed, meets, at least in some portion, all the requirements as stated in
Chapter II outlining a good network intrusion detection system. There is much more
work to be done in applying an actual implementation, but the architecture and design
offered here provide a solid basis. In addition to providing a conclusion to this thesis, the
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next chapter will review these requirements as stated in Chapter II and provide details as
to how this system meets them.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. REQUIREMENTS SATISFACTION
The following reviews the requirements for a good intrusion detection system as
stated in Chapter II and relates how the above design satisfies these requirements.
1. Requirement 1: Recognition
The system must recognize initial potentially suspect behavior (the triggering
event): The Misuse Detector and the Anomaly Detector are the components that seek and
recognize suspicious behavior. They exist as part of every agent that sits on every host.
In addition, the central collection of some of the activity on various hosts allows for the
recognition of distributed attacks.
2. Requirement 2: Escalating Behavior
The system must recognize escalating suspicious behavior on a single host or
across hosts: The Misuse Detector and the Anomaly Detector are both used to
continuously seek and recognize escalating behavior. In addition, the attack object
classes allow for the instantiation of particular attack threads that have a life cycle for as
long as the threat is active.
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3. Requirement3: Communication
The system components on various hosts must communicate with each other
apprising them of a change in the level of alertness whether escalating or de-escalating:
A communications protocol was established containing the information necessary to
relate the alert levels and attack types from one host to another. The Communications
Interface hierarchy in the object model also supports the generation of, sending to,
receiving of, and response to these messages.
4. Requirement 4: Response
The system components must take the appropriate action that corresponds with a
level of alertness: The attack class hierarchy contains a response method that is defined
for each attack class. The actual implementation should be written to respond according
to the level of alertness, attack type and stage of attack.
5. Requirement 5: Manual Control
The system must allow for manual intervention in the changing of alertness: The
User Interface allows for direct manipulation of each object in the model. This gives the
system administrator direct control over the state of any object in the system.
Furthermore, each agent can act as the master to the system at any given time. This
would allow the system administrator access at any given node in the network. If an
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attack requires manual intervention, the system administrator can use any machine to
perform the intervention and propagate the results to all the other relevant nodes.
6. Requirement 6: Adaptability
The system must be highly adaptable to be able to respond quickly to the ever
changing methods of attack: The existence of an attack hierarchy allows for the addition
of new attack types with ease. Therefore, the system can respond as quickly as it takes to
write or modify an algorithm to respond to an attack. Since each response is kept in
separate attack classes, these modifications can be applied with no trickle down effects on
other parts of the system. Therefore, the system can keep functioning properly with
respect to attacks other than the one being added or modified. However, there is a
downside to this. This system is adaptable in the sense that the modularity of the system
makes it easier to add new attack types and responses without affecting the rest of the
system, but not necessarily in real time. The system does rely on experts to analyze new
threats and define its features and that can take months. However, in the few cases where
a new threat can be analyzed immediately by an administrator or programmer, this system
would support the addition of this attack class in near real time. Ideally, this system
would adapt on its own. One aspect not addressed here was the ability to learn. A very
sophisticated system could learn to identify, or be trained to handle, new attacks as they
become apparent, thus making it more adaptable in real time. This is discussed further in
the conclusions section of this thesis.
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7. Requirement 7: Concurrency
The system must be able to handle multiple, concurrent attack threads: The
architecture alone provides for this as each agent can deal with attacks that are occurring
only on its own machine. However, the existence of the attack hierarchy allows for
further concurrency by providing for the concurrent instantiation of attack objects. This
means that whenever a unique attack is recognized, its existence is recorded in an
instantiation of an attack class of that attack type. The Misuse and Anomaly Detectors
can keep track of and communicate with each instantiated attack object. Each
instantiation can be realized on the system as a separate process allowing for concurrent
attack threads.
8. Requirements: Scaleability
The system must be able to scale as the network grows: The architecture provides
for this. As a node is added to the network, so is an agent to run on that node. Since the
agents run independently of each other, they can be added without adversely affecting the
performance of the other agents. Unlike other systems that monitor network traffic at a
single point in the network where the increase in data that results from growth might
cause serious performance problems, independent agents only have to deal with the data
for a single system. As new hosts are added to the network, the number of messages
received by any one agent should increase linearly on average. But will the processing of
these messages increase linearly? I think they would. I envision that each agent
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processes each message on a first come, first served basis. There would be no need to
sort messages or nor should there be any relationship between messages. As each
message is received by the listener on each host, the host forks off a process to handle it.
Therefore, each host can handle messages in rapid succession. The amount of time to
handle a message should be fairly short, so the total number of forked processes at any
given time should peak at an amount that is based on the number of processes that can be
forked within the average process time of a message. This should fall well within the
capabilities of each machine. If a host is unable to receive a message, the sender can retry
for some set number of time before quitting to prevent backlog of messages.
9. Requirement 9: Resistance to Compromise of Intrusion Software
Itself
The system must be able to protect itself from unauthorized use or attack: The
actual ability to protect itself depends on the implementation. There are many ways to
secure software outside the scope of this thesis, but the system design offered here also
supports efforts toward this end. The addition of an encrypted security key to each
message provides protection from spoofed messages. And any attempt to access the
system itself can be thwarted by the addition of an attack class of this type of attack. If
the method of attack on the security system is known, then that attack can be modeled
into an attack class and the system itself can monitor for any activity matching that model
and respond to it appropriately. Furthermore, the heterogeneous nature of the agents
makes it more difficult to define a single attack that could affect all the agents in the
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system with the same intended results, thus making it difficult to define an attack that
could compromise the whole system.
10. Requirement 10: Efficiency and Reliability
The system should be efficient, reliable, resistant to degradation and run in a
heterogeneous platform environment: The ability to apply the most effective detection
method directly to each class of intrusion type makes it more efficient. Only the most
appropriate code need be executed and only on the machine where the attack is taking
place. If any node agent goes down, they system still runs in full. Only the machine upon
which the agent was running becomes vulnerable. The rest of the network is protected.
The distribution of the load also goes to support resistance to degradation. And each
agent is implemented specifically for the platform upon which it runs, but can
communicate with each other regardless of platform.
11. Requirement 11: Extensibility
The system must be extensible: As new attack types are defined, they can be
added to the various agent implementations and only to those agents to which this type of
attack is relevant Furthermore, this architecture can support the augmentation of
additional intrusion detection or monitoring tools with little impact on the existing
system. For example, LAN monitoring tools, network sniffers, combined audit trail
analyzers can be added and communicate with the rest of the hosts in the network as if
they were a host of their own.
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12. Requirement 12: Flexibility
The system must be flexible in the establishment of security policy and
management across hosts: The autonomous nature of the agents on each host that can
perform any subset, up to the full set, of functionality of the system allows for this
flexibility. Each administrator can configure his own values of recall or precision to
establish his own thresholds against which to perform some action. In addition, he can
choose which attack types to monitor, or even write his own kind of responses. In a
network that crosses organizational boundaries, this is very important because it may be
difficult to enforce a centralized policy and administrators may be hesitant to even install
this system on their host. Some policy is better than none.
B. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has proposed an architecture and design of a real-time intrusion
detection and response system for use in large heterogeneous networks. The field of
applying intrusion detection techniques that can be effective in recognizing intrusions in a
network and then responding to these threats in real time is relatively new. The number
of robust, yet efficient solutions is limited to a few. This thesis proposed a solution that
attempts to satisfy all the major issues of a network-wide intrusion detection system;
namely, scaleability, flexibility, extensibility, fault tolerance, efficiency and, of course,
ability to perform.
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A distributed architecture composed of autonomous agents and an object-oriented
design were used as a means to this end. Most intrusion detection systems to date were
just that. They made little attempt to include real-time response to intrusions. While
intrusion detection is valuable, detection after the fact could come too little too late.
Ideally, an intrusion detection system can respond to an imminent attack to mitigate the
potential damage, even if the response is simply to page an administrator so that a manual
response can be performed. The system proposed in this thesis provides for any number
of automated responses to different types of attacks with varying levels of seriousness.
Another level of response not addressed in great detail in previous systems is
performing preemptive measures to protect a host against imminent attacks as a result of
recognizing the existence of an attack somewhere else in the network. This thesis
provides a solution for this as well through the use of alert-level notification messages.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Not all issues were resolved. A system of this type requires an agent to be
running on every host that wishes to be protected. However, any host that does not install
one of these agents will not be adequately protected. It might receive some protection if a
network layer monitor is added as a component, but that is the case only if there is some
network level response, such as denying access to the network from the source of the
attack through a firewall or such. If this is not done, then any host without an agent is
still vulnerable to attack since it cannot respond to an attack or notifications of a potential
attack.
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Additionally, while this system can be used to identify known misuse attacks or
anomalous behavior, it does not yet adequately deal with recognizing misuse attacks not
previously documented. New kinds of attacks are appearing everyday. Unless the
administrators of this system are constantly updating the attack profiles, the network will
always be vulnerable to unknown attacks. It would be ideal if mechanisms could be
developed that could learn to recognize new attacks, especially if they are just variants of
known attacks, and automatically apply them. This will not be an easy task.
Also, while the concepts of recall and precision were proposed in this thesis to
deal with the issue of false positives and negatives, it would be desirable to have a way to
minimize the number of false positives and negatives instead. Crosbie and Spafford [Ref.
8] proposed a training module with their system that would teach the agent how to better
recognize attacks using various scenarios and using genetic programming. This kind of
approach could be useful to supplement the architecture as proposed in this thesis.
This thesis proposed an architecture and design. No implementations have been
provided. In fact, the architecture and design is meant to be open so that implementations
can be swapped out at any time when newer, better approaches become available thus
permitting the system to grow with technology and avoid the problem of becoming
obsolete. Further work would be required to move this system from the design proposed
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